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NOTES AND COMMENTS
judgment in allowing unconstitutional legislation to be quickly and
effectively contested before irretrievable loss has occurred. It is sub-
mitted that the Supreme Court could properly allow the declaratory
judgment a more liberal application in federal constitutional litigation,
consonant with its status and intended use, without being forced to
decide any hypothetical cases based on insufficient facts.
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RALPH M. STOCKTON, JR.
Eminent Domain-Hydroelectric Adaptability as Element of Just
Compensation-Effect of Federal Power Act
The Constitutional provisions' for payment of "just compensation '
for land taken by means of eminent domain proceedings have generally
been regarded as securing to the owner the market value of the land
considering its best possible future use, i.e., the price which would be
agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and
a purchaser willing to buy.2  This general rule is applied where dam
sites are condemned,3 but a complicating factor arises when the owner
claims the special adaptability of his land for hydroelectric development
as an element of value. This special adaptability has generally been
allowed as a factor to be considered where a reasonable possibility of
connection with the other required tracts has caused purchasers in the
open market to take hydroelectric possibilities into account, quite apart
from the needs of the condemnor.4 The tendency has been in the direc-
tion of a more strict application of this rule so as to eliminate any
consideration of dam site adaptability where it appears that combination
of the tracts by open market purchases is not reasonably probable. 5
""If the remedy through a declaratory judgment does not at least in part
fill the gap between law and equity there would be little purpose in enacting the
statutes providing for such procedure." Schaefer v. First Nat. Bank of Findlay,
134 Ohio St. 511, 518, 18 N. E. 2d 263, 267 (1938).
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V; AMEND. XIV requires the states to provide just
compensation for private property taken. Most state constitutions have such a
provision. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eninent Domain, 42 COL. L.
REv. 596 (1942) ; McKean, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Power of Eminent
Domain, 6 RocKy MT. L. REv. 16 (1933); Recent Cases, 7 U. oF CHI. L. REv.
166 (1939).
2 BAUER, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 427 (1919) ; FIELD, THE LAW
OF DAMAGES §846 (1876); II LEWIS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED SA ATS §478 (2d ed. 1900); III SEDG-,WICK, DAMAGES §1171 (9th ed.
1920); IV SUTHERLAND, THE LAW OF DAMAGES §1064 (4th ed. 1916).
'See Note, 106 A. L. R. 955 (1937).
' McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342 (1936), reversing 74 F. 2d 596
(C. C. A. 9th 1935); Ford Hydroelectric Co. v. Neely, 13 F. 2d 361 (C. C. A.
7th 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 723 (1926) ; accord, Mississippi and Rum River
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878). See Notes, 124 A. L. R. 910 (1940),
106 A. L. R. 955 (1937) ; Note, 2 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1927).5 Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934), affirming 67 F. 2d 24 (C. C. A.
8th 1933) ; accord, North Kansas City Development Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co., 147 F. 2d 161 (C. C. A. 8th 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 867 (1945);
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For compensation to be allowed for the land's special adaptability
for hydroelectric development, the use of the property for power pur-
poses must have been reasonably probable without the use of eminent
domain to obtain the other tracts necessary for the dam and reservoir.0
This last rule has limited the possibility of considering such special
adaptability in assessing just compensation, since the typical situation
is one where many tracts must be acquired for such a project, the result
being that the special adaptability is of no value to a hypothetical market
that has no power of eminent domain in order to effect such combina-
tion.7 If the condemnor is the United States and the likelihood of com-
bining the land of the condemnee with necessary land of others by
purchase is too remote to affect market value, the fact that the con-
demnee actually has the power of eminent domain from a state and might
thereby acquire the other tracts will not be considered in determining
whether there is a reasonable possibility of the condemnee's land being
combined with other tracts necessary for a power development. 8
In the case which established this refinement, it was stipulated that
the stream concerned was non-navigable. Where the stream is navi-
gable, the effect of the commerce clause of the United States Constitu-
tion must be considered if the United States is the condemnor. Resting
on the argument that a private riparian owner has no property right in
the water power of a navigable stream, the rule seems well established
that the United States need not pay compensation for dam site adaptabil-
Baetjer v. United States, 143 F. 2d 391 (C. C. A. 1st 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
772 (1944); United States v. Boston, C. C. and N. Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877
(C. C. A. 1st 1921). Dolan, Present Day Court Practice in Condemnation Suits,
31 VA. L. REv. 9 (1944) ; Note, 35 HARv. L. REv. 76 (1921) ; Comment, 26 TEX.
L. REv. 199 (1947).
6 McCoRmIcI, LAW OF DAMAGES §129 (1935); Developnents in the Law-
Damages, 61 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1947).
'New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915), reversing In re Bensel, 206 Fed.
369 (C. C. A. 2d 1913) ; McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363 (1913) ; Medina
Valley Irr. Co. v. Seekatz, 237 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 5th 1916) ; Note, 44 YALE
L. J. 1095 (1935). N. C. follows these principles regarding special adaptability
value. Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. 2d 10
(1941).
'United States ex re. and for the Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943), reversing 118 F. 2d 79 (C. C. A. 4th 1941),
wdifying T. V. A. v. Southern States Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 519 (W. D. N. C.
1940), mandate conformed to, 138 F. 2d 343 (C. C. A. 4th 1943), cert. denied,
321 U. S. 773 (1944). This case extends the rule that dam site value need not
be compensated for (1) where the likelihood of combining the necessary tracts
is too remote to affect market value, or (2) it could only be done by one armed
with a power of eminent domain. Simply stated, the extension is that even though
the condemnee has a power of eminent domain granted by a state, this will not
be considered as bearing on the matter of reasonable possibility of combining the
necessary tracts where the land is taken through the exercise of Federal eminent
domain powers. It is significant, however, that Parker, J., refused to allow the
condemnee's land to be valued solely on the basis of small separated tracts of wild
mountain land in conforming to the higher Court's mandate. Notes, 38 ILL. L.
REv. 218 (1943), 18 TENN. L. Rav. 300 (1944).
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ity value," the rights and relations being fixed by the adoption of the
Constitution."0
Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro" presented for the
first time the question of whether a licensee of the Federal Power Com-
mission acquired by reason of its license -any of the Federal Govern-
ment's immunity from liability for the payment of compensation based
on hydroelectric adaptability when condemning a dam site on a navigable
stream. Grand-Hydro, a private corporation, had been granted a fran-
chise and eminent domain powers by the State of Oklahoma for devel6p-
ment of hydroelectric power on the Grand River. Several years later,
the state legislature created the Grand River Dam Authority, a con-
servation and reclamation district, for hydroelectric development of the
Grand River Basin.12  Grand-Hydro owned the land constituting the
Pensacola dam site which GRDA condemned in an action brought in
the state courts. GRDA maintained that no evidence of value as a dam
site should be admitted for several reasons based on local law, but all
these were decided against GRDA. The contention that since GRDA
had a license from the Federal Power Commission and Grand-Hydro
did not, GRDA was the only agency which could legally build a dam
at the site concerned and should not have to pay Grand-Hydro for a
value the latter could not legally enjoy was also rejected.13  On appeal,
'United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913);
Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F. 2d 541 (C. C. A. 9th
1943), modifying 41 F. Supp. 119 (E. D. Wash. 1941), cert. denied, 320 U. S.747 (1943); Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (C. C. A. 9th
1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 715 (1937) ; United States v. West Virginia Power
Co., 56 F. Supp. 298 (S. D. W. Va. 1944); accord, United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940), reversing, 107 F. 2d 769 (C. C. A.
4th 1939).
10 Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (C. C. A. 9th 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U. S. 715 (1937).169 Sup. Ct. 114 (1948), affirming, 201 P. 2d 225 (Okla. 1947).1 2 QKLA. STAT. ANNOTATED, tit. 82 §§861-881. The statutory grant of power
to exercise a power of eminent domain read as follows: "To acquire by con-
demnation any and all property of any kind, real, personal, or mixed, or any
interest therein within or without the boundaries of the District necessary or con-
venient to the exercise of the powers, rights, privileges and functions conferred
upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by general law with respect to con-
demnation." OxLA. STAT. ANNOTATFD, tit. 82 §862(f) (Supp. 1948). The gen-
eral law referred to is OKLA. STAT. ANNOTATED, tit. 66 §§51-63 (1937). In North
Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT. §§56-1 to 56-10 (1943) grants eminent domain powers
to power companies with the proceedings for condemnation to be as set out in
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§40-11 to 40-29 (1943). Apparently, the general condemnation
procedure in both states was designed originally for railroads.
" Grand-Hydro v. Grand River Dam Authority, 192 Okla. 693, 139 P. 2d 798(1943) reversed the lower court which had excluded evidence of dam site value.
That the Oklahoma Court did not reach this decision without considerable diffi-
culty is attested to by a decision affirming the judgment which was subsequently
withdrawn: 130 P. 2d 311 (advance sheets only, as decision withdrawn before
bound volume 130 P. 2d published). The second trial resulted in a judgment in
favor of Grand-Hydro for full dam-site value and was affirmed by the state court.
Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 201 P. 2d 225 (Okla. 1947), cert.
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the United States Supreme Court affirmed 5-4 without deciding this
vital federal question.
The Court was content to let the Oklahoma decision stand that such
a federal license was not necessary on the part of Grand-Hydro in
order for the evidence of dam site value to be considered.1 4 This result
was based on the following: (1) the petition for condemnation made
no reference to the Federal Power Act or rights claimed thereunder;
and (2) the Federal Power Act had merely attached conditions to the
use of the land for a power site rather than rendering the site valueless
to an owner for that purpose. The state law as to measure of compen-
satiorg, consequently, was held to be unaffected by the Act.
The first point is narrow for a decision of such public significance.
The second seems contrary to the plain language of the Federal Power
Act,' 5 for it certainly seems to have rendered a power site valueless for
power uses insofar as a non-licensee owner is concerned.'0 The issue
of whether a licensee of the FPC has the rights of the United States in
the waters of the flowing stream under the commerce clause is not
decided.
The history of the Federal Power Act and the earlier Federal Water
Power Act is one of an attempt to preserve the water power in a navi-
gable stream for the public, rejecting the idea of private ownership of
the power in a navigable stream.17 There is authority that such water
denied, 332 U. S. 841 (1947), cert. granted, 333 U. S. 852 (1948), aff'd, 69 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1948).
In July, 1939, the Federal Power Commission had granted a license to GRDA
on the basis of a finding that the proposed construction would affect interstate
commerce because of its effect on the Arkansas River, a navigable stream.
"4 The assumption that there could be two valid outstanding FPC licenses to
diff6rent parties covering the same site has no foundation in the Federal Power
Act.
r41 STAT. 1063, as amended, 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§791a-825r (1946).
"s Since the condemning party already has a license, the present owner is power-
less to get one. Should he or any grantee other than the licensee attempt to
develop the site, it seems that 16 U. S. C. §817 (1941) would be violated: "It shall
be unlawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose of developing
electric power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit, reser-
voir, power house, or other works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of
the navigable waters of the United States ...except under and in accordance
with the terms of a ... license granted pursuant to this chapter."
Though the Oklahoma Court relied to some extent on the fact that the Federal
Power Commission found that the GRDA came under the Act because the Grand
River dam affected interstate commerce rather than because it was a navigable
stream, the United States Supreme Court decision does not rest on this distinction.
Apparently, federal regulation and control apply equally in the two situations.
See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S. 508, 525 (1941) ;
Gatchell, The Role of the Federal Power Commission in Regional Development,
32 IowA L. REv. 283 (1947).
7 Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation of Water Re-
sources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274 (1938); Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective
Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 9 (1945); Scott, Is
Federal Control of Water Power Development Inconsistent With State Interests,
9 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 631 (1941); Comment, 39 MicH. L. REv. 976 (1941). For
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in a navigable stream is not property at all, but if anyone has a property
interest it would seem to be the public for public uses.18  Thus, it does
not follow that a private owner of land bordering a stream coming
within federal control should be paid for the water power potentialities;
to do so would reimburse him for something not owned by him, or, as
Justice Douglas expresses it in the dissent, "give private parties an
entrenched property interest in the public domain, which the Federal
Power Act was designed to defeat."' 9 The policy expressed in this
argument and in prior cases 20 dealing with the effect of the commerce
clause on dam site condemnation appears to have been rejected mainly
because the licensee here had brought the condemnation suit in a state
court, relying primarily on eminent domain powers granted by the state.
The Court intimates that were the licensee seeking to condemn the dam
site by virtue of its federal license, value due to dam site adaptability
would not be an element of compensation.
Under the Federal Power Act, a licensee is granted the power of
eminent domain, and it is expressly provided that the power can be
exercised in the state courts or federal district courts, the practice and
procedure of the state where the land lies being followed as nearly as
may be if the proceeding is in the federal district court.2 ' This can
hardly mean that the state court can ignore substantive rights based on
federal statutes.22 Since the licensee relies on a federal statute, the
another point of view see Le Boeuf, An Industry Appraisal of Federal Regulation
of Electric Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, 14 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 174
(1945).
8 Bennett, Some Uncertainties in the Law of Water Rights, 21 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 344 (1948).
" See Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 69 Sup. Ct. 114, 122(1948) (dissenting opinion). To allow the private owner without a license to be
compensated for the site taken on the basis- of its value as a hydroelectric site is
to allow the owner a benefit in terms of money which the Federal Power Act
denies him as far as actual use is concerned. Is such a "loophole" consistent with
the Act and the policy it represents?
20 See note 9, supra.
2141 STAT. 1074 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §814 (1946). Proposed Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure No. 71A will provide a federal condemnation procedure super-
seding this provision if it is accepted. Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation
Cases in the District Courts of the United States Prepared by the Advisory Com-
mittee oi Rules for Civil Procedure, 7 F. R. D. 503 (1948). There has been
consideration of such a rule before. The proponents claim that "it is better to
have a single procedure, even if it is not so good, than a lot of different pro-
cedures, which in themselves may be marvelous." Nichols, The Federal Power of
Eminent Domain, 4 FED. B. A. J. 159 (1941). The order of the United States
Supreme Court of December 29, 1948, authorizing the transmittal of new rules
of civil procedure to the Attorney-General for reporting to the present session
of Congress did not include proposed rule 71A. 93 L. Ed. 251 (1948).
"The question is not what happens in a federal district court proceeding
where such practice and procedure is to be used, but rather concerns an action in
a state court. Even if it has some significance in this case, recent decisions re-
strict the "practice and procedure of the state" provision to procedural matters
,nly, the federal and not state law governing the basis and measure of damages
since these matters arise under federal law. U. S. ex rel. and for Use of T. V. A.
1949]
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Federal Power Act, it would seem that it would have to be considered
since it is "the supreme law of the land."123
Probably the most equitable result would be to exclude any con-
sideration of value based on dam site adaptability, but to reimburse the
condemnee for expenditures made in good faith.2A This principle would
be limited considerably, however, if land owners and hydroelectric com-
panies could be presumed to know the effect of the Federal Power Act
on dam site value in condemnation proceedings and be required, there-
fore, to take it into account in transactions involving dam site lands.
The difficulty in applying this principle is the uncertainty caused by the
continually expanding definition of "navigable stream."2  Actually,
most private power companies do not pay large premiums for dam site
adaptability in their condemnation of the land, so there seems no good
reason to reimburse them on that basis.20
A decision that a federal licensee need not compensate for dam site
value in a condemnation case would have the effect of stimulating private
power companies to develop dam sites and accept FPC licenses where
they have acquired the sites under state-granted eminent domain powers,
but have delayed plans for proposed dams because of the conditions
attached to the 50-year FPC license.27 Otherwise, they would run the
risk of a licensee taking the site under federal eminent domain powers,
the site being valued as farm or mountain land only.
These uncertainties ought to be settled. With 6,undreds of unlicensed
v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943); United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369(1943); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 166 F. 2d 856 (C. C. A. 8th
1948) ; State of Nebraska v. United States, 164 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 8th 1947);
United States. v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F., 2d 874 (C. C. A. 3rd 1946);
United States v. Johns, 146 F. 2d 92 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; accord, United States
v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). Contra: Central Nebraska Public Power and
Irr. District v. Harrison, 127 F. 2d 588 (C. C. A. 8th 1942). Dolan, Present Day
Court Practice in Condemnation Suits, 31 VA. L. REv. 9 (1944) contains an ex-
cellent discussion on this point. Also see Hitching and Claxton, Practice and Pro-
cedure in Eminent Domain Cases Under the T. V. A. Act, 16 TENN. L. Rw. 952
(1941) ; Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and Its Agents
foi Injuries to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TENx. L.
Raw. 801 (1941).23U. S. CozsT. Art. VI, §2.
2" Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Case, 31 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1931);
Steiner, Eminent Domain Damages, 6 Mo. L. REv. 166 (1941).5 Note, 19 N. C. L. Rav. 379 (1941) ; Comment, 39 Micir. L. Ray. 976 (1941).
The use of the term "navigable". to determine whether a river comes within Fed-
eral control under the commerce clause has served its usefulness and should be
discarded. It is a fiction now, for the Court no longer means "navigable" in the
sense of navigation or transportation, but means that the river is too important
to the commerce of the nation for an3; of a number of reasons to leave under state
,control.I" This is because such lands are typically owned by many small land owners
when condemned and evidence of special adaptability for dam site development is
not admissible in the usual case. See Note, 106 A. L. R. 955 (1937).
27 Note, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 379 n. 19 (1941).
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plants apparently within the scope of federal control,2 with many unde-
veloped power sites in private hands, with the absolute supremacy of
the federal power of eminent domain over persons and states,2 the vital
question of whether compensation is to include dam site adaptability
value should be decided.30 If it is included, the public will have to pay
for it either in rates3 ' or on recapture after the end of fifty years.3 2
But the principal case has not helped at all for it indicates that the
federal right involved may be recognized in a federal court but may be
ignored in a state court. In a dissenting opinion written after the
United States Supreme Court had affirmed the judgment of the Okla-
homa Court, Chief Justice Hurst stated what must occur to all who
crave simplicity in the law: "I see no reason why the rule should not
be the same in both instances."' '
LEONARD S. PoWERs.
Evidence-Fornication and Adultery-Admissibility Under Statute
of Extrajudicial Confessions for Corroboration
The statute declaring fornication and adultery a crime1 concludes
with the following proviso: that the admissions or confessions of one
[participant] shall not be received in evidence against the other. The
statute has remained on the books in that same language since 1854,2
and the cases that have arisen under it are numerous. The interpreta-
tion given to the proviso had been regarded as well-settled-that it meant
exactly what it says. *Recently, however, the court went far toward
emasculating ninety-four years of construction in the case of State v.
Davis.3 Defendant, superintendent of an orphanage, and Lola Mae
Reeves, a fourteen-year-old girl in his charge, were indicted under the
statute. After the State had accepted the feme defendant's plea of noto
contendere, she was placed upon the stand where she testified, over de-
fendant's objection, that she had had intercourse with the defendant on
at least six occasions during a certain three month's time. Marguerite
"1 Gatchell, Jurisdictional Problems Under the Federal Water Power Act of
1920, 14 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1945).
"t Dolan, supra, note 22, at 10; Recent Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 305 (1930).
" That it is no trifling matter is demonstrated by the principal case where the
difference in valuation of a little over 400 acres, with and without dam site
adaptability being considered, meant nearly a million dollars to the jury.
3141 STAT. 1073 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §§812, 813 (1946).
"41 STAT. 1071 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 844 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §807
(1946). The Supreme Court expressly refused to recognize these two factors as
having any bearing on the point.
" Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 201 P. 2d 225, 235 (Okla.
1947) (dissenting opinion).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-184 (1943).
'N. C. CODE c. 34, §45 (1854).
'229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948).
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